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Abstract. We extend to the predicate frame a previous characterization of the maximal 
intermediate propositional constructive logics. This provides a technique to get maximal 
intermediate predicate constructive logics starting from suitable sets of classically valid 
predicate formulae we call maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logics. As an 
example of this technique, we exhibit two maximal intermediate predicate constructive 
logics, yet leaving open the problem of stating whether the two logics are distinct. Further 
properties of these logics will be also investigated. 
Key words: intermediate predicate logic, nonstandard intermediate predicate logic, predi 
cate constructive logic, nonstandard predicate constructive logic, maximal predicate con 
structive logic, maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic, smooth predicate con 
structive logic. 
1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. 03B55, 03C90. 
1. Introduction 
The maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property 
and the explicit definability property (we call predicate constructive logics) 
have been scarcely investigated in literature. In this frame, we know that the 
cardinality of their set is 2kO [6]. However, the proof of this result cannot 
be used to provide a complete characterization of any maximal predicate 
constructive logic, since it is based on an indirect argument requiring the 
Axiom of Choice. The same paper [6] (and, independently, [1, 12]) proves 
that the cardinality of the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics 
with the disjunction property (we call propositional constructive logics) is 
2kO too. Also in this case (as in [1]), the proof is indirect and uses the Axiom 
of Choice. 
In literature the study of the maximal propositional constructive logics is 
in a more advanced state than the study of the maximal predicate construc 
tive logics. For instance, starting from Kirk's discovery that the greatest 
propositional constructive logic does not exist [14], the problem of counting 
the number of maximal propositional constructive logics has been consid 
ered in several papers [1, 6, 12, 18, 19, 23] (providing also some picture of 
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the class of these logics, as in [23]), while the importance of such logics in 
connection with Minari's conjecture [21] has been pointed out in [2]. Also, 
Medvedev's maximal propositional constructive logic of the finite problems 
is rather well known [4, 5, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26] (even if the problem of a 
recursive axiomatization of this logic is still open). Finally, in [26] a first 
explanation of a method to single out maximal propositional constructive 
logics is given, which in [4, 5] is systematically used to get Kripke frames 
semantics for infinitely many maximal propositional constructive logics (in 
[4, 5] also some points of possible interest for a classification of the set of 
the maximal propositional constructive logics are analyzed). On the con 
trary, the problem of counting the maximal predicate constructive logics has 
been proposed (and solved) only in [6]. Moreover, no example is known in 
literature of a maximal predicate constructive logic. 
The purpose of this paper is both to extend the techniques for the in 
vestigation of the maximal propositional constructive logics, given in [26], 
to the predicate case and to present the first examples of maximal predi 
cate constructive logics. In this frame, we will introduce the nonstandard 
predicate logics, which differ from the intermediate predicate logics for being 
closed only under special substitutions (such as the substitutions of atomic 
formulae with negated formulae). Then we will define four operators work 
ing on the standard and nonstandard predicate logics and, generalizing the 
results of [26], we will prove the existence of a one-to-one correspondence 
between standard and nonstandard maximal predicate constructive logics. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will introduce 
the basic conventions and definitions, recalling notions such as intermediate 
predicate logic, disjunction property and explicit definability property. We 
will also introduce the notion of nonstandard predicate logic, to be used in 
the subsequent sections. 
In Section 3 we will deal about the relations between standard and non 
standard predicate constructive logics, in particular between maximal stan 
dard predicate constructive logics and maximal nonstandard predicate con 
structive logics. In this frame, we will introduce the operators of extension 
(transforming any nonstandard predicate logic into a nonstandard predicate 
logic), standardization (transforming any nonstandard predicate logic into 
a standard predicate logic), reduction (transforming any nonstandard pred 
icate logic including Kuroda logic [11, 24, 25, 32] into a standard predicate 
logic), and weak reduction (transforming any nonstandard predicate logic 
into a standard predicate logic). 
Finally, in Section 4, we will introduce two nonstandard predicate logics 
M1 and M2 by means of variants of a "special kind" of non-kripkean se 
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mantics based on the notion of classical provability; the two logics will be 
provided by different definitions, but we have not yet proved that they are 
distinct. We will show that they are maximal nonstandard predicate con 
structive logics and will put into evidence some principles holding in them 
and in the (standard) maximal predicate logics related to them. We will 
also provide an interesting characterization of M2 and its standardization 
in terms of an appropriate generalization at the predicate level of the no 
tion of "smoothness" considered in [26] and in [30] (in [30] called "structural 
completeness" and connected with a problem raised by H. Friedman on the 
propositional constructive logics [7]). 
2. Preliminary notions 
First of all, the set of the predicate well formed formulae (predicate wff's 
for short) is defined, as usual, starting from the propositional connectives 
-, V, A, -+, the quantifiers V and 3, a denumerable set of individual vari 
ables xo0xl, ..., xn, ... (also denoted x, y, z, v, w, ...) and, for every n > 0, a 
denumerable set of n-ary predicate variables POn, P1,-..., Ph,... (also denoted 
pn, Qn, Rn, ... where, for n = 0, one recovers the propositional variables). 
The notation A X-+ B will be taken as an abbreviation of (A -+ B) A (B -+ A). 
The notions of free individual variable and bounded individual variable are 
defined as usual. We will say that a predicate wff is open if some free in 
dividual variable occurs in it; otherwise, the predicate wff will be said to 
be closed. The universal closure of an open formula (disregarding the order 
of the involved universal quantifiers) is defined as usual, while the universal 
closure of a closed formula will be taken as the formula itself; the notation A* 
will indicate the universal closure of the predicate wff A. When only propo 
sitional variables are considered, one obtains the propositional well formed 
formulae (propositional wff's). Symbols such as A, A', B, B', C, C', ... (with 
possible indexes) will denote predicate or propositional wff's. Notations such 
as A(x) will be used to indicate that x is a possible free variable of A. More 
generally, A(xl, ..., xn) (with n > 1) will indicate that xI, ..., xn may be free 
in A. Also, notations such as x will indicate (possibly empty) sequences of 
distinct individual variables and A(x) will indicate that the variables of x 
may occur free in A; in this line, if P is a predicate variable whose arity is not 
put into evidence and x is a sequence containing a number of variables coin 
ciding with the arity of P, the notation P(x) will indicate the atomic formula 
built up starting from P and the variables of x, placed in P(x) according to 
their order in x. A negated wff will be any predicate or propositional wff A 
such that A = --B for some B. A predicate negatively saturated wff will be 
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any predicate wff A such that every occurrence in A of a predicate variable 
is in the scope of a negation. Correspondingly, a propositional negatively 
saturated wff will be any propositional wff A such that every occurrence in 
A of a propositional variable is in the scope of a negation [4, 5, 26]. A predi 
cate Harrop wff [13, 28, 32] will be any predicate wff A such that A is either 
atomic or negated, or A = B A C with B and C predicate Harrop wff's, or 
A = VxB with B a predicate Harrop wff, or A = B -+ C with C a predicate 
Harrop wff. In particular, a propositional Harrop wff will be either an atomic 
or negated propositional wff, or the conjunction of two propositional Harrop 
wif's, or an implication whose consequent is a propositional Harrop wff. 
An individual substitution is any function r1 from the set of all the indi 
vidual variables to the same set. Given any individual substitution rq and 
any wff A, the result of the application of rq to A (denoted r1A) is defined as 
the predicate wff obtained from A by correctly substituting each free indi 
vidual variable x in A with r7(x) (see any textbook of mathematical logic for 
the definition of substitution of free individual variable in a predicate wff; if 
the substitution is not correct, i.e., for some x the variable r7(x) is not free 
in A, then we say that it is empty for A and we set rA = A). 
A predicate substitution is any function a associating, with every pred 
icate variable pn, a predicate wff cr(Pn) such that at least n distinct free 
individual variables (in a one-to-one correspondence with the places involved 
in Pn) occur in a(Pn). Given any predicate substitution a and any pred 
icate wff A, the result of the application of a to A (denoted oA) is the 
formula obtained from A by correctly replacing each atomic formula of 
the form Pn(zi, ...,zn) with the predicate wff S ZfnU(x,-..., x,Z) (where 
U(xi,n...,x) = a(Pn) may contain also free individual variables different 
from xl,...,xn and Sxl Jn U(xl,...,Xn) is obtained from U(xl,...,xn) by 
replacing the free occurrences of xi, ..., xn with z1, -.., zn; for a precise defini 
tion of correct substitution, see, e.g., [3, 27]). If the substitution a cannot be 
correctly performed for A, we say that a is empty for A and we set oA = A. 
A predicate negatively satured substitution (NegSat-substitution for short) 
will be any predicate substitution oaNS replacing every predicate variable 
with a predicate negatively saturated wff. An Harrop predicate substitu 
tion (simply H-substitution when no confusion arises) will be any predicate 
substitution aH such that, for every predicate variable pn, H (pn) is a pred 
icate Harrop wff. Finally, a restricted predicate substitution (r-substitution 
for short) will be any predicate substitution ar such that, for every predicate 
variable pn, ar (pn) is a negated predicate wff. In a similar way, mutatis mu 
tandis, one defines the notions of propositional substitution (denoted aprop), 
propositional negatively satured substitution (denoted NrS ) Harrop propo 
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sitional substitution (denoted cH 
,p) 
and restricted propositional substitution 
(denoted cprrop) [4, 5, 26]. 
A predicate transformation (transformation for short) T is either a re 
stricted predicate substitution ar (in which case r is empty for a wif A if 
0r is), or an individual substitution r7 (in which case r is empty for a wff 
A if q is), or a composition of two transformations Tr and T2 (in which case 
T is empty for a wff A if T1 is empty for T2A or T2 is empty for A). If 
F = {Bl ..., Bn}, B1, ..., BBn are predicate wff's and r is a transformation, 
by TrF we will indicate the set of predicate wff's {TrB, ..., rBn}. 
By INT (INTprop) and CL (CLprOp) we will indicate the set of intu 
itionistically valid predicate (respectively, propositional) wff's and the set of 
classically valid predicate (respectively, propositional) wff's. 
An intermediate predicate logic will be any set L of predicate wff's such 
that INT C L C CL, and L is closed under detachment (i.e., A E L and A -+ 
B E L implies B E L), generalization (i.e., A E L implies VxA E L for every 
individual variable x) and predicate substitution (i.e., A E L implies aA E L 
for every predicate substitution o). Likewise, an intermediate propositional 
logic will be any set L such that INTprop C L C CLprop, and L is closed 
under detachment and propositional substitution. We recall that, for every 
intermediate predicate logic L, the set PROP(L) = {A 1 A E L and A 
is a propositional wff} is an intermediate propositional logic [6], called the 
greatest intermediate propositional logic included in L. 
Near the notions of intermediate predicate logic and intermediate propo 
sitional logic, we will consider the notions of nonstandard propositional logic 
[4, 5, 26] and the new framework of nonstandard predicate logic. We say that 
a set L of predicate wff's is a nonstandard predicate logic iff INT C L C CL 
and L is closed under detachment, generalization and r-substitution (i.e., 
A E L implies crrA e L for every r-substitution ar). Likewise, a nonstan 
dard propositional logic will be any set L of propositional wff's such that 
INTprop C L C CLprop, and L is closed under detachment and restricted 
propositional substitution. As in the standard case, one can easily prove 
that, for every nonstandard predicate logic L, the set PROP(L) = {A I A E 
L and A is a propositional wff} is a nonstandard propositional logic, called 
the greatest nonstandard propositional logic included in L. 
We will sometimes identify a logic (predicate or propositional, standard 
or nonstandard) with the set of theorems of some formal system. In this 
sense, if E is a set of predicate axiom schemes and L is an intermediate 
predicate logic, the notation L + E will indicate the intermediate predicate 
logic obtained by adding the instances of the axiom schemes of E to L, i.e., 
the smallest set of predicate wff's closed under detachment and generaliza 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.69 on Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:47:01 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
378 A. Avellone, C. Fiorentini, P. Mantovani, P. Miglioli 
tion which includes the set L U Z*, where Z* is the set of all the instances of 
the elements of E. Note that the set E* is a set of wff's closed under predicate 
substitution, and the same holds for L. Likewise, we will represent interme 
diate propositional logics by notations such as Lprop + Zprop, Lprop being an 
intermediate propositional logic and Eprop being a set of propositional axiom 
schemes. On the other hand, if L is a nonstandard predicate logic and E' is 
a set of classically valid predicate wff's closed under r-substitution or such 
that urA E L U E' for every r-substitution ar and every A E Z', then the 
notation L ? E' will denote both the formal system (closed under detach 
ment and generalization) obtained by adding (as axioms) the elements of E' 
to L and the related set of theorems, which is a nonstandard predicate logic. 
In a similar way, if Lprop is a nonstandard propositional logic and Zprop is 
a set of classically valid propositional wff's closed under restricted proposi 
tional substitution or such that TpropA E Lprop U 
E/ 
rop for every restricted 
propositional substitution lprrop and every A E ZproP5 then Lprop & E/rop will 
indicate both a formal system and a nonstandard propositional logic. 
The notation KL will indicate provability in a (standard or nonstandard, 
predicate or propositional) logic L. Thus, A E L and HLA will have the 
same meaning. Further, if F is either a set of predicate wff's or a set of 
propositional wff's, then FKLA will indicate the fact that there are B1, ..., Bm 
(with n > 0) such that {B,,., Bm} C F and B, A ... A Bm -+ A E L (if 
m = 0, B, A ... A Bm 
- A stands for A). 
Given a set 'I of predicate or propositional wff's, we will say that 'I has 
the disjunction property iff A E 'P or B E 'P whenever A V B E TI. Also, if @P 
is a set of predicate wff's, then 'P will be said to have the explicit definability 
property iff 3xA(x) E ' implies that A(y) E 'P for some variable y (where 
A(y) indicates the result of a correct substitution of the individual variable 
x with the individual variable y in A). 
We will be interested in the disjunction and explicit definability prop 
erties when the set ' is a (standard or nonstandard, predicate or proposi 
tional) logic L. In this frame, we will say that L is an intermediate predicate 
constructive (nonstandard predicate constructive) logic iff L is an interme 
diate predicate (nonstandard predicate) logic and L has simultaneously the 
disjunction property and the explicit definability property. Also, L is an 
intermediate propositional constructive (nonstandard propositional construc 
tive) logic iff L is an intermediate propositional (nonstandard propositional) 
logic and L has the disjunction property. 
For the sake of readability, in the following we will omit the specifica 
tion "intermediate"; for instance, "intermediate predicate logic" will be syn 
onymous with "predicate logic" and "intermediate propositional logic" with 
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"propositional logic". Also, "logic" will indicate a predicate or a proposi 
tional logic, and " nonstandard logic" will stand for a nonstandard predicate 
or propositional logic. In this line, we will have predicate constructive logics, 
nonstandard predicate constructive logics, propositional constructive logics, 
nonstandard propositional constructive logics, constructive logics and non 
standard constructive logics. 
A maximal predicate (respectively, nonstandard predicate) constructive 
logic will be any predicate (respectively, nonstandard predicate) constructive 
logic L such that, for every predicate (respectively, nonstandard predicate) 
constructive logic L', L C L' implies L = L'. Also, L is a maximal propo 
sitional (respectively, nonstandard propositional) constructive logic iff L is 
a propositional (respectively, nonstandard propositional) constructive logic 
and L C L' implies L = L' for every propositional (respectively, nonstandard 
propositional) constructive logic L'. 
To our further purposes, the following lemma will be useful (the proof is 
easy, see, e.g., [6]): 
LEMMA 2.1. Let L be a predicate logic or a nonstandard predicate logic. 
Then L has the explicit definability property if, for every open predicate 
wff A = 3xB(x,yl,...,ym) (with m > 1) such that Y1,..,Ym are exactly 
the free individual variables of A, A E L if one of B(yi,yi,...,ym) 
B(ym,yi,...,ym) belongs to L. 
From now on, K (Kuroda logic) will stand for the predicate logic INT + 
{(KUR)} where (KUR) is the following axiom schema: 
Vx-n-lA(x) -+ -'-iVxA(x) (with A any formula). 
Equivalent axiom schemas are: --'Vx(A(x) V -iA(x)) and -'(Vx-'--nA(x) A 
-'VxA(x)) (with A any formula). 
It is well known that, for any predicate wff ---A and for any set F of 
predicate wif's, F K- -A iff rKLA (see, e.g., [11, 24, 25, 32]). Note that this 
result holds for intuitionistic propositional logic as well (i.e., for any propo 
sitional wff -'-'A and for any set F of propositional wff's, FH-NT 1 --'A iff 
FKCLproPA, see, e.g., [15, 16]), but it generally does not hold in the predi 
cate frame replacing K with INT. As a matter of fact, the above principle 
-_-'Vx(A(x) V -'A(x)) clearly does not belong to intuitionistic predicate logic. 
We call kurodian any nonstandard predicate logic L such that KC L. As 
we will see in the last part of Section 4, kurodian logics play an important 
role in the study of predicate smoothness. 
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3. Relations between standard and nonstandard predicate 
logics 
In the previous section we have introduced the notion of non standard pred 
icate logic. Now, in a strict parallelism with the results of [26] for the propo 
sitional case, we investigate the relations between standard and nonstandard 
predicate logics. 
The predicate extension operator is the operator E associating, with 
every nonstandard predicate logic L, the set of predicate wff's E(L) = 
L E {- -iA X A I A is an atomic predicate wff}. 
If A(P1, ..., Pn), for some n > 1, is a predicate wff containing exactly the 
predicate variables Pi, ... P (whose arities are not put into evidence) and L 
is a nonstandard predicate logic, then, from the definition of E(L), one easily 
gets that A(P1, ..., Pn) C E(L) iff (---PI(x 1) -+ P, (x ) 
* 
/\ (-+Pn(xn) 
Pn(xn))* -+ A(P1, ..., Pn) E L. Hence, a straightforward adaptation of the 
proofs of the corresponding propositional cases, given in [26], provides the 
two following facts: 
PROPOSITION 3.1. If L is a nonstandard predicate logic then so is E(L). 
PROPOSITION 3.2. If L is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic then so 
is E(L). 
Generally, if L is a nonstandard predicate logic, then L $: E(L). From 
now on, we will call regular any nonstandard predicate logic L such that 
L = E(L). 
PROPOSITION 3.3. Let L be any regular nonstandard predicate logic. Then 
L is closed under H-substitution. 
PROOF. Since --A + A E L for every A atomic, we have that -'-'A +X 
A C L for every A atomic; thus, since --'A X-+ A E INT for every negated 
wff A = -'B, we have that -_-'A +e A E L for every A atomic or negated. 
This is the basis of an easy induction stating that, for every predicate Harrop 
wff Z, --'Z +-e Z E L. Now, let A E L and let aH be any H-substitution; 
also, let ar be the r-substitution associating, with every predicate variable 
pnf, the wff --aH(pn); then we have that orA E L. On the other hand, by 
the above discussion, (uJr(pn) X gH(pn))* E L; thus, since the replacement 
theorem holds in L, we get oHA E L. a 
The predicate standardization operator is the operator S associating, with 
every nonstandard predicate logic L, the set of predicate wff's S(L) such that, 
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for every wff A, A E S(L) iff, for every predicate substitution a, uA E L. 
The following Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.6 generalize the corresponding 
propositional cases explained in [26]. 
PROPOSITION 3.4. If L is a nonstandard predicate logic, then S(L) is a 
predicate logic. 
LEMMA 3.5. Let A be any predicate wff without occurrences of _. Then 
there exists a H-substitution aUH such that auHA E INT. 
PROOF. Let CH be the H-substitution replacing every atomic formula 
P(x,...,-xn) with the predicate Harrop wff P(x,...,-xn) -* P(x1,...,xn). 
Then, by an easy induction on the complexity of any predicate wff A without 
negation, one can prove that aHA E INT. a 
THEOREM 3.6. If L is a regular nonstandard predicate constructive logic, 
then S(L) is a predicate constructive logic. 
PROOF. Suppose that S(L) does not satisfy the explicit definability 
property. Then, by Lemma 2.1, there is an open predicate wff 3xB(x, yl,... 
Yin) (m > 1) such that 3xB(x, YI, Y2, ... Ym) E S(L), but B(yl, y, ...,Y) 5 
S (L) and. .. .and B (ym, yl ,.., Ym) 0 S(L). 
Let us represent B(x,yl,...,ym) by B(P1, ..., Pk, x, y1, .., ym), to put into 
evidence that Pi,..., Pk are the predicate variables occurring in B (we will 
not be interested, on the other hand, in indicating the arities of PI, ..., Pk). 
Let 1 < i < m; since B(P1, ..., Pk, Yi, ... , Ym) 0 S(L), by definition of S(L) 
there is a predicate substitution ori such that aiB(P,, ..., Pk y Yi v Yl .. Yim) v 
L. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Yl, .... Ym are the only 
free individual variables included in uiB(P1, ..., Pk, yi, Yi, ... Yinm). For, if 
riB(P1, ..., Pk, Yi, Yi, X Ynm) contains v1, ..., Vh as additional free individual 
variables, we can replace in riB(P,, ..., PPk, Yi,Yl, , Ym) every atomic for 
mula involving v1,..., Vh with an atomic formula not involving v1, ..., vh, so 
as to get a formula 0 with the following properties: the only free individ 
ual variables of 0 are yl ,...,ym; 0 has the form a'B(P1,...,Pk,yi,y1,...,yM) 
for some o'; there is an H-substitution oaH such that oHO coincides with 
riB(P1, , Pk, Yi5Y13 ..., Ynm). Since L is closed under H-substitution, voiB(P1, 
... Pk, Yi Y1 ... Ym) 0 L implies that 0 0 L; thus, if riB(P,, ..., Pk, yi, Yl, ... 
Ym) does not satisfy the required properties, we can take 0 in place of 
aiB(P,, ,Ph Yi UlY l ym) Now, by B(Ci,..., Ck, yi, , Ym) we will in 
dicate the predicate wff aiB(P,, ..., Pk, Yi,Yl ..., YM), where we put into evi 
dence the only free individual variables Yi, ..., Ynm, and where, for 1 < j < k, 
Ci is the formula ai (Pj). Since L is closed under H-substitution, we can 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.69 on Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:47:01 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
382 A. Avellone, C. Fiorentini, P. Mantovani, P. Miglioli 
also assume that, for i1, i2, 11, i2 such that 1 K i1, i2 < m, 1 < il, J2 < k, 
and i1 $& i2 or ji $& i2, no predicate variable occurring in the formula Ci = 
oril (Pjl) occurs in the formula Cj2 = cr2(Pj2) (for every i with 1 < i < m 
there is a formula B(ZI, ..., Zik y yi, y... Ym) such that: no predicate variable 
occurring in ZZ occurs in Z2 if il $3 2; B (C%, , Ck, Y yi yv *... * ym) can be 
obtained by applying to B (Z{, ... , Zk, Yi & Yi , ... Ymi) a predicate substitution 
replacing predicate variables with predicate variables of the same arity; of 
course, if B(C ., Ck,' yi Y , Ym) 0 L then, a fortiori, B(Z, ... Zki yjyi,1 
5 Ym) ' L). Finally, the fact that L is closed under H-substitution allows 
also to assume, without loss of generality, that, for every i with 1 < i < m 
and every j with 1 < j < k, the formula C0 does not contain occurrences 
of negation. As a matter of fact, let D be any predicate wff, let P0 be a 
0-ary predicate variable not occurring in D, and let 4p, (D) be the predi 
cate wff obtained from D by replacing in D every occurrence of a subfor 
mula such as --K with an occurrence of the formula K -+ PO; let apo be 
the H-substitution leaving unchanged all the predicate variables different 
from PO and such that oJpo(P0) = P0 A -,PO; then, considering the for 
mula opo(Qpo(D)), we have that hTNTD + upo(qpo(D)). Thus, if some 
formula C0 does not satisfy our requirements, we can choose some appropri 
ate PO and take qpo (C) in place of C0i: from the above discussion it follows 
that the assumption that B(C,..., C, ..., Ck, Yi, Y1 ...Ym) 5 L implies that 
B 1, ..., PO (C3i), ..., Ck, Yi, Yl 
.. Ym) L 
Now, consider the predicate substitution a such that, for every j with 
1 < j < k, u(Pj) = CJ A ... A Cjm; let, in line with the above nota 
tions, 3xB(C A ... A Cm C A ... A Ckmx,yj,...,ym) indicate the for 
mula a3xB(x, Yl, ... Ynm), where Yi 5... Ym are the only free individual vari 
ables. Since 3xB(x,yl, ...ym) E S(L), by definition of S(L) we have that 
xB(Cl A ... A CCm, ..., A ... A C xY1, , Ym) E L. Since L is constructive, 
by Lemma 2.1 one of B(Cl A...AC{ , ..., ACkm, Y1, ..., Yinm) ..., B(C1 A 
Cm, ... CA... A Ck/7 Ymi Y1i X. Ym) belongs to L; let, for the sake of def 
initeness, B(C1 A ... A Cm, ..., C A ... A CM Y1,Y1, ..., Ym) CL. By Lemma 
3.5 and the properties of the formulas Cl,..., Cm C, ..., Ckm, for every i 
and j with 1 < i < m and 1 < j < k, we can choose an H-substitution 
ai,j such that ui,jC CE L. Since no predicate variable occurring in Cj1 oc 
curs in CZ2 for 1 < i1,i2 < m, 1 <- il,2 < k, and il $ i2 or il $ ]2, 
we can define an H-substitution a* with the following properties: for every 
i and j such that 2 < i < m and 1 < j < k, if P is a predicate vari 
able (of any arity) occurring in CJ then cr*(P) = or,i(P); if P is not a 
predicate variable occurring in some C' with 2 < i < m and 1 < j < k 
then v*(P) = P. It turns out that aj*C = C for every j such that 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.69 on Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:47:01 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On maximal intermediate... 383 
1 < j < k, while a*C} E L for 2 < i < m and 1 < j < k; hence, one 
has that Cl X- u* (Cl /\ ... A C' ) e L, ..,kXv(Cl A\.. A Ck ) E L. Being 
U*B(C1 A ... AC CM A ... A Ckm, yl yl... ym) E L, by the replacement 
theorem it follows that B(C1,..., Ckl,yi,yi,...,ym) E L. This contradicts 
what has been previously stated about B(C1, ..., Ck, Yl, Yl v*, Yi). 
In a quite similar way one can prove that S(L) satisfies the disjunction 
property. U 
By Theorem 3.6 and Proposition 3.1 one immediately gets: 
COROLLARY 3.7. If L is any predicate constructive logic, then S(E(L)) is a 
predicate constructive logic and L C S(E(L)). 
As in the propositional case, if L is a maximal predicate constructive 
logic, then L = S(E(L)), i.e., L is a fixed point of the operator S o E 
transforming predicate constructive logics into predicate constructive logics. 
Thus, calling SE-stable any (possibly non constructive) predicate logic L 
such that L = S(E(L)), we have that every maximal predicate constructive 
logic is SE-stable just as it happens in the propositional case (see [26]). On 
the other hand, in the propositional context SE-stability is equivalent to 
NegSat-determinatedness (see [26]). In the predicate frame the same can be 
stated, in general, only for the kurodian logics. 
To be more precise, we say that a predicate logic L is predicate negatively 
saturatedly determinated (NegSat-determinated for short) iff the following 
condition holds for every predicate wff A: 
if OaNSA E L for every NegSat-substitution aNS, then A E L. 
Now, using the properties of the logic K, we can prove: 
LEMMA 3.8. Let A(P1, ..., PPn) be any predicate negatively saturated wff, whe 
re P1, ..., Pn (with n > 1) are the predicate variables occurring in it (whose ar 
ities are not put into evidence). Then A(P1, ... Pn) ++A(---lPi, ...,Pn)EK 
PROOF. An easy induction on the complexity of the formula A(P1,.... 
Pn), taking the negated subformulae of A(P1,_,Pn) in the basis of the 
induction and using the replacement theorem. The starting point is that 
---B (Pi.... Pn) +-* B( P1...,--Pn) EK. To prove the latter fact one 
has that 
-nB(P,5...,Pn) X -B(iP E-1--Pn) E CL, which implies, by 
the properties of K, -(B(Pi, ..., Pn) X+ B( P1, ..., --- -Pn)) EK; since 
(-- B (P1,..., Pn) X+-- B(-P1,..., -, -Pn)) B (_(PI,...Pn) + 
-- 
B (--l-lpi 
-- 1 CPn)) E INT, it follows that -'B(P1, ... Pn) e B PI(--P... PnEP)CK. 
Now, we can prove: 
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THEOREM 3.9. Let L be any kurodian predicate logic. Then L is SE-stable 
if L is NegSat-determinated. 
PROOF. Let L be SE-stable and let acNSA E L for every NegSat 
substitution crNS. Since (P(x) e+ _P(x))* e E(L) for every predicate 
variable P, by the replacement theorem it follows that aA E E(L) for every 
substitution a; hence, A E S(E(L)) and, since L = S(E(L)), A E L. Thus, 
L is NegSat-determinated. 
Conversely, let L be NegSat-determinated, A E S(E(L)) and oNS be any 
NegSat-substitution. Then auNSA E E(L); hence (for some n) (-_-_P1(x1) -+ 
P1(x1))* A ... A (Pn(xn) -+ Pn(xn))* 
- ( NSA)(Pi ... Pn) E L, where 
the notation (oNSA)(Pi, ..., PPn) indicates that the formula aNSA contains 
the predicate variables P,, ..., Pn. Since ( (x) e -Pl--nP(x1))* A ... A 
(~~~~Pn(n) -+ ~Pn(xn))* E INT and L is closed under r-substitution, 
it follows that (,NsA)( -'-1-FPn) E L. Since KC L, by Lemma 3.8 we 
get oNSA E L. Hence, being orNS any NegSat-substitution, we have that 
A E L. Since A is any element of S(E(L)), it follows that L = S(E(L)). a 
REMARKS: 
D The proof of the above theorem shows that any SE-stable predicate 
logic L is always NegSat-determinated, whether or not L is kurodian. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis KC L seems to be necessary in 
order to prove that a NegSat-determinated predicate logic L is SE 
stable, since, otherwise, Lemma 3.8 fails; for instance, --'VxP(x) X 
1Vx 
-P(x) INT. 
D Not only the maximal predicate constructive logics are NegSat-deter 
minated. For, one can prove thsat also the non-maximal predicate 
constructive logic INT is SE-stable, and hence NegSat-determinated. 
Of course, the predicate non-constructive logic CL is SE-stable, and 
hence NegSat-determinated. 
D We do not know examples of non-kurodian NegSat-determinated pred 
icate logics which are not SE-stable. 
D K can be seen to be an example of kurodian NegSat-determinated 
(and hence SE-stable) non-maximal predicate constructive logic. 
Now, let L be any nonstandard predicate logic. Then NS(L) = {A I A is 
predicate negatively saturated and A E L}, while WNS(L) = {arA 1 A E L 
and ar is an r-substitution which is not empty for A}. Moreover, we call 
R(L) = INTEDNS(L) the reduction of L and WR(L) = INTEDWNS(L) the 
weak reduction of L (recall that INTEDNS(L) is the closure of INTUNS(L) 
under generalization and modus ponens and the like for INT E WNS(L)). 
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THEOREM 3.10. Let L be a nonstandard predicate logic. Then: 
1. WR(L) C R(L); 
2. WR(L) is a predicate logic; 
3. if L is kurodian then R(L) is a predicate logic and R(L) = K e 
WNS(L) = K e WR(L). 
PROOF. 
1. Immediate, since if A E L and ar is not empty for A then arA E L 
and A is predicate negatively saturated. 
2. Let 0,rA E WNS(L) for some A E L and some r-substitution or 
which is not empty for A. Let ao be any substitution. Then (even 
if or is empty for urA) there is a restricted substitution gr such that 
OllarA = uSA. It follows that WNS(L) is closed under arbitrary 
substitutions, hence WR(L) = INT @ WNS(L) is. 
3. Let L be kurodian. Then, since all the instances of the axiom-schema 
(KUR) are predicate negatively saturated wff's we have K C R(L), 
hence K @ WNS(L) = K Ef WR(L) C R(L). 
On the other hand, A(P*,...,Pv) E NS(L) implies A(P,...,P P) E 
L, which implies A(t-P1, , ) C WNS(L), which implies, by 
Lemma 3.8, A(P1,...,Pn) E K ) WNS(L); hence R(L) = INT (E 
NS(L) C K E WNS(L) = K ED WR(L). Thus, if L is kurodian then 
R(L) = K E WNS(L) = K E3 WR(L); hence, since K and WNS(L) 
are closed under arbitrary substitutions, R(L) is a predicate logic. 
REMARKS: 
D Even for a kurodian nonstandard predicate logic L we may have 
WR(L) #& R(L). For instance, WR(K) = INT ff WNS(K) $4 K = 
R(K). 
D We do not know whether there is a non-kurodian nonstandard predi 
cate logic L such that R(L) is not a predicate logic. 
D Let the propositional counterparts of the operators R and WR be Rprop 
and WRprop respectively. Then Rprop and WRprop coincide for every 
nonstandard propositional logic. 
Now, as in the corresponding propositional case [26], whether or not L is 
kurodian (and whether or not R(L) is standard), we can prove: 
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THEOREM 3.11. If L is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic then R(L) 
is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic and WR(L) is a predicate con 
structive logic. 
PROOF. We take into account only R(L), since the proof for WR(L) 
is quite similar. Also, we may consider R(L) as the set of predicate wff's 
provable in the calculus CR(L) consisting of the natural calculus for INT 
(see [29]), modified so as to treat as a primitive symbol, and of a set of 
zero-premisses rules (the intuitionistically unprovable formulae of NS(L)), 
which we call "axioms" of R(L). So, a wff belongs to R(L) iff there is a 
proof of it in CR(L) without undischarged assumptions. 
Now, we say that a predicate wff A is well contained (wc for short) in 
R(L) iff A E R(L) and one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
1. A is negated; 
2. A = B A C, and B is wc in R(L) and C is wc in R(L); 
3. A = B V C, and B is wc in R(L) or C is wc in R(L); 
4. A = B -+ C, and if B is wc in R(L) then C is wc in R(L); 
5. A = VxB(x), and, for every individual variable y, B(y) is wc in R(L); 
6. A = 3xB(x), and there is an individual variable y such that B(y) is 
wc in R(L). 
Then, since L is constructive, first of all we have the following fact, whose 
proof is an easy induction on the complexity of A: 
(P1) if A E NS(L) then A is wc in R(L). 
Using (P1) we can prove: 
(P2) let 
A15) ... 5 An 
B 
be a proof of the calculus CR(L), where A1,..., An are the undis 
charged assumptions and B is the consequence; let Al, ...,An be 
wc in R(L); then B is wc in R(L). 
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The proof of (P2) is by induction on the complexity of the proof H1 and is 
similar to the proof of Point P2 of the proof of Theorem 5 of [26]. Thus, as 
an example of a typically predicative rule, we will illustrate only the case of 





let z be any individual variable, and let H12 be the tree obtained from 
C(z) 
H1l by replacing in it every predicate wff such as D(y) with the predi 
C(y) 
cate wff SzYD(y) (these individual substitutions can be correctly performed, 
modulo renaming of bounded variables). Since y does not occur free in the 
undischarged assumptions of H1 (otherwise the VI-rule has not been cor 
rectly applied), it turns out that 2 is a proof of the calculus CR(L) 
C(z) 
whose undischarged assumptions coincide with the ones of H1 ; then, by 
C(y) 
induction hypothesis, we have that C(z) is wc in R(L). Since z is any indi 
vidual variable and since VxC(x) E R(L) (as a consequence of the fact that 
the undischarged assumptions of H, being wc in R(L), belong to R(L)), 
B = VxC(x) turns out to be wc in R(L) by Point 5 of the definition of 
predicate wff wc in R(L). 
Now, using (P2), we can prove: 
(P3) All the formulae of R(L) are wc in R(L). 
To prove (P3), let A e R(L). Then there is a proof Hl in CR(L) without 
A 
undischarged assumptions. Hence, by (P2), A is wc in R(L). 
Having (P3), we can conclude our proof as follows. If A V B E R(L), 
then A is wc in R(L) or B is wc in R(L); a fortiori, A E R(L) or B E R(L). 
Likewise, we can prove that if 3xA(x) c R(L) then there is y such that 
A(y) E R(L). 
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PROPOSITION 3.12. Let L be any nonstandard predicate logic. Then: 
1. L C E(WR(L)); 
2. E(WR(L)) = E(R(L)); 
3. if L is regular then L = E(R(L)) = E(WR(L)); 
4. if L is kurodian then R(L) = R(E(L)) C L; 
5. if L can be expressed as INT @ AX, where AX is a set of predicate 
negatively satured wff's, then R(L) = L; moreover, if L is kurodian 
then R(E(L)) = L. 
PROOF. 
1. If A(PI, .P,) E L then A(i Pl, ... C WR(L). Since, for 
every predicate variable P, (-'-1P(x) -+ P(x))* E E(WR(L)) (where x 
is an appropriate sequence of individual variables), then A(P1, P,,P) E 
E(WR(L)). 
2. From the previous case one gets E(L)CE(E(WR(L)))=E(WR(L))C 
E(R(L)) C E(L); hence the assertion. 
3. Since E(R(L)) C E(L), the assertion immediately comes from the 
previous cases. 
4. The proof easily follows from Lemma 3.8. 
5. Since L = INT & AX and the predicate wff's of AX are negatively 
saturated, L C R(L); on the other hand, of course, R(L) C L, hence 
L = R(L). If, in addition, L is kurodian, by the above Point 4 we have 
also R(L) = R(E(L)). 
PROPOSITION 3.13. If L is a nonstandard predicate logic, then WR(L) C 
S(L). 
PROOF. By Theorem 3.10 we have that WR(L) is a predicate logic; 
also, WR(L) C L. Since, by definition, S(L) is the greatest predicate logic 
included in L, the assertion immediately follows. E 
THEOREM 3.14. If L is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic 
and L' is a predicate constructive logic such that WR(L) C L' then L' C 
S(L). 
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PROOF. Let L' be any predicate constructive logic such that WR(L) C 
L'. Since L is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic, L = 
E(L) and, by Point 3 of Proposition 3.12, L = E(WR(L)). By hypothesis, 
WR(L) C L' and hence E(WR(L)) C E(L'). Therefore, by the maximality 
of L and the fact that, by Proposition 3.1, E(L') is a nonstandard predicate 
constructive logic, L = E(L'); hence L' C L. Since L' is a predicate logic 
included in L and S(L) is the greatest predicate logic included in L, L' C 
S(L). m 
COROLLARY 3.15. If L is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive 
logic, then S(L) is a maximal predicate constructive logic. 
PROOF. By Proposition 3.13 we have WR(L) C S(L). Hence, if S(L) C 
L', we have WR(L) C L'. The assertion then follows from Theorem 3.14. a 
THEOREM 3.16. If L is a maximal predicate constructive logic, then E(L) 
is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
PROOF. By Proposition 3.1, E(L) is a nonstandard predicate construc 
tive logic. Now, let L' be any nonstandard predicate constructive logic such 
that E(L) C L'; then S(E(L)) C S(L'), from which, since by Corollary 
3.7 we have L C S(E(L)), we get L C S(L'). Also, since E(L) C L', 
L' = E(L'); hence L' is regular and, by Theorem 3.6, S(L') is a predi 
cate constructive logic. Since L is a maximal predicate constructive logic, 
L = S(L'). On the other hand, by Proposition 3.13, WR(L') C S(L'). Thus, 
WR(L') C S(L') = L, which implies E(WR(L')) C E(L). But L' is regular, 
hence, by Point 3 of Proposition 3.12, L' = E(WR(L')). It follows that 
L' C E(L) and E(L) turns out to be maximal. 
REMARKS: 
D Theorem 3.14 says more than Corollary 3.15. As a matter of fact, 
Theorem 3.14 allows to say that not only S(L) is a maximal predicate 
constructive logic, but also that it is the greatest predicate constructive 
logic among the ones including WR(L). 
D By Corollary 3.15 and Theorem 3.16, there is a one-to-one correspon 
dence between maximal predicate constructive logics and maximal non 
standard predicate constructive logics, the correspondence associating 
every standard object with the unique nonstandard object containing 
it. 
D Of course, by Zorn's Lemma, i.e., by the Axiom of Choice, there is a 
maximal predicate constructive logic. Indeed, in the following section 
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we will exhibit examples of such logics (without using the Axiom of 
Choice). These logics will turn out to be kurodian. A question we leave 
open in this paper is whether there are maximal predicate constructive 
logics which are not kurodian. 
4. Two examples of maximal predicate constructive logics 
Let Negf i be the set of all finite sets of negated predicate wff's. Then the 
notion of F-sound predicate wff is inductively defined as follows. 
Let A be a predicate wff and let r E Negf j. Then A is F-sound iff 
[-cLA and one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
1. A is atomic or negated; 
2. A = B A C, and B is P-sound and C is F-sound; 
3. A = B V C, and B is F-sound or C is F-sound; 
4. A = B -X C, and, for every F' E Negfi, and every transformation 
T such that, for every Z E F U {B -< C}, T is not empty for Z and 
TrF C F if T-B is F'-sound then TC is F'-sound; 
5. A = 3xB(x), and there is an individual variable y such that B(y) is 
F-sound; 
6. A = VxB(x), and, for every individual variable y, B(y) is F-sound. 
We point out that the empty set 0 belongs to Negfi2. Thus, we define 
the set M1 of predicate wff's as: 
M1 = {A I A is 0-sound}. 
REMARKS: 
D Without affecting the definition of M1, we could restrict ourselves to 
all the consistent elements of Negfin, as it can be easily shown. 
tD Furthermore, since in F-soundness the involved provability is the clas 
sical one, we could as well define Negfin as the set of all finite sets 
of predicate wff's (negated or not). However, the definition of Negfi, 
we have given above turns out to be more convenient in proving the 
maximality of M1. 
D Note that the definition of "A is F-sound" involves, in Point 4, the 
predicate wff's TF U {TA}, in particular the wff rA. However, since 
any transformation r is a composition of individual substitutions and 
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r-substitutions, the relevant complexity of rA does not exceed the one 
of A. For, in the definition of F-soundness, the basic Point 1 takes 
as elementary formulae both the atomic and the negated ones, while 
individual substitutions do not affect the complexity of formulae. In 
this sense, the inductive definition of F-soundness is quite correct and 
gives rise to the set of wff's M1, which, as we will see, turns out 
to be a kurodian maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic, 
but not a maximal (standard) predicate constructive logic; to get a 
logic of the second kind (closed with respect to substitutions affecting 
in an essential way the complexity of formulae) one has to consider, 
according to Corollary 3.15, S(M1). 
Now let us show that M1 is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic. To 
this purpose, we first need some technical lemmas. 
LEMMA 4.1. For every predicate wif A, for every F, F' E Negfin and for 
every transformation T such that, for every Z E F U {A}, T is not empty for 
Z and Tr C F', if A is F-sound then rA is F'-sound. 
PROOF. By induction on the complexity of A. First of all, if FK-LA 
then, obviously, r'KCLrA. Thus, if A is an atomic or negated formula then 
the assertion follows trivially. Moreover, when A = B V C, or A = B A C, 
or A = 3xB(x), or A = VxB(x), the result easily follows from the induction 
hypothesis. Let A = B -X C, let A be F-sound and let us suppose that 
T is such that, for every Z E F U {B -+ C}, T is not empty for Z, but 
r(B -+ C) is not F'-sound. Then, since F'KCLT(B -+ C) holds, by Point 
4 of the definition of r'-sound wff there must be a rF and a T' such that, 
for every Z E F' U {T(B -+ C)} T' is not empty for Z, 'rF C F"%, T'TB 
is F"-sound, but 'TrC is not r"-sound. Since the composition T1T is still 
a transformation, let us call it r". We have that there is F" together with 
T" such that Tr"F C F" for every 0 E F U {B -+ C} T" is not empty for 0, 
Tr"B is F"-sound, but r"C is not F"-sound; hence B -X C is not F-sound, a 
contradiction. U 
The next corollaries immediately follow from the previous lemma. 
COROLLARY 4.2. M1 is closed under r-substitution. 
PROOF. The proof follows trivially from Lemma 4.1, taking 0 for F and 
F', and any ar for r. U 
COROLLARY 4.3. M1 is closed under generalization. 
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PROOF. The proof follows trivially from Lemma 4.1, taking 0 for F and 
F', and any individual substitution r1 for T. U 
LEMMA 4.4. INT CM1. 
PROOF. It will suffice to prove the following fact. Let 
AH An 
B 
be any proof in the natural calculus for INT (see [29]) modified so as to 
treat _ as a primitive symbol, where A1, ..., An (n > 0) are the undischarged 
assumptions and B is the proved formula. Then, for every F E Negfin, if 
A1,-, An are F-sound then B is F-sound. 
To show the assertion one goes on by induction on the complexity of the 
proof. The basis (introduction of assumption) is immediate and the various 
cases of the induction step are easily handled. Here we will consider only 
the most interesting case, namely the one corresponding to the inference rule 
X+I. 
Let our proof H have the form: 
A15 ... ) An) [C] 
H1 
D 
C -o D 
Since Al,,- An are F-sound, we have rKCLA1, ... rFCLAn. 
On the other hand, since {A1,,..., A}iNTB (by the existence of our 
proof) and since INT C CL, we have {A1,..., An}cLB. It follows that 
FCLB. 
Now, let F' E Negfin and let T be any transformation such that, for 
every Z E F U {C -+ D} r is not empty for Z, Tr C F', and TC is F'-sound. 
Then, first of all we can built up the proof 
,rA1,.., TAn, TC 
H12 
TrD 
having the same tree-structure as H1 (hence, having the same complexity 
as H1), where we assume, without loss of generality, that, for every 0 e 
{A1,5... An} T is not empty for 0 (if T is empty for some 0 E {A, .An}c 
we can go on similarly, choosing some T' and F" such that, for every 0' E 
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F U {A1, ..., An)5 C, D}, T' is not empty for 0', TrF C F`, and T'C, T'D and F` 
differ from TC, rD and rF only for a renaming of variables; here one proves 
that if K E {C, D} then TK is F'-sound if T'K is F"-sound). Since A1, ..., An 
are F-sound, from Lemma 4.1 we get that rA1, ..., rAn are F'-sound; hence, 
since TC is F'-sound, all the undischarged assumptions of H2 are F'-sound, 
which implies, by induction hypothesis, that TD is F'-sound. Thus, since F' 
and r are any, B -+ C turns out to be F-sound. E 
The three following facts come immediately from the definition of 0 
soundness. 
LEMMA 4.5. M1 C CL. 
LEMMA 4.6. M1 is closed under detachment. 
LEMMA 4.7. M1 has the disjunction property and the explicit definability 
property. 
From the previous lemmas the following corollary immediately follows: 
COROLLARY 4.8. M1 is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
Now, to better understand what is involved in M1, we put into evidence 
some formulae and principles (axiom-schemes) belonging to it. The knowl 
edge that these formulae and principles are in M1 will be also used to prove 
that M1 is a kurodian maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
We start from the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4.9. M1 = E(M1). 
PROOF. Let A be atomic. Then, for every F E Negfin and every trans 
formation T which is not empty for --'-nA -+ A, T -_-A is F-sound iff TA is 
F-sound, by definition of F-soundness of atomic and negated formulae. Since 
0KCL A -+ A and TO C F for every F, we therefore have that - --,A -+ A is 
0-sound, i.e., -n--nA -+ A E M1. E 
By Proposition 4.9, M1 cannot be a predicate logic. As a matter of 
fact, if M1 were closed under arbitrary substitutions, then -_-_A -4 A would 
belong to M1 for every predicate wff A, i.e., M1 would coincide with CL. 
But M1 $& CL, since M1 is constructive and CL is not. 
Putting together Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 4.9, we have the fol 
lowing corollary: 
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COROLLARY 4.10. M1 is closed under H-substitution. 
Coming to the axiom-schemes, we have: 
PROPOSITION 4.11. Every instance of (KUR) belongs to M1. 
PROOF. Immediate, since K= INT + {(KUR')}, where {(KUR')} is 
the set of all the instances of the form -i(Vx--'1A(x) A -_VxA(x)). The latter 
formulae, of course, belong to M1, since they are negated formulae belonging 
to CL. M 
Now we introduce Kreisel and Putnam disjunction principle, we will call 
(KPv), and Kreisel and Putnam existential principle, we will call (KP3). 
The former is well known to every people working in intermediate proposi 
tional logics [10, 11, 17], while the latter, which is also known in the area 
of constructivism as (IP) (see, e.g., [32]), naturally completes the mean 
ing of the former at the predicate level. The two principles are so de 
fined: (KPv) is the axiom-schema whose instances are all the formulae 
(-_A -+ B V C) -+ (--A -4 B) V (-_A C), where A, B and C are arbitrary 
predicate wff's; (KP3) is the axiom-schema whose instances are all the for 
mulae (-iA -? ?xB(x)) -? Sx(- A -+ B(x)), where A and B(x) are predicate 
wff's such that x is not free in A. We have: 
PROPOSITION 4.12. All the instances of (KPv) and all the instances of 
(KP3) belong to M1. 
PROOF. Consider, e.g., (KP3). Then, first of all, for every A and B(x) 
with x not free in A, we have OKcL(-A -X 3xB(x)) -+ 3x(-_A - B(x)). 
Now, let F E Negfin, and let T be any transformation such that r is not 
empty for (--A -* 3xB(x)) -- 3x(--A X B(x)) and T(-nA -+ 3xB(x)) is 
F-sound. Then, by Lemma 4.1, T(-nA - ]xB(x)) is (F U {T-'A})-sound 
(where Tr-A = -'TA is a negated wff). Since Tr-A is (F U {Tr-A})-sound, it 
follows that T3XB(x) = ]XTB(x) is (F U {T-1A})-sound, i.e., there is y such 
that TB(y) is (F U {T -A})-sound. The latter fact implies, in particular, 
that FKCLT(-A -+ B(y)). On the other hand, let F' E Negfin and let 
T' be any transformation such that, for every Z E r U {T(-1A -+ B(Y))} 
T' is not empty for Z, Tr C F' and 7'T-'A = -1`'TA is F'-sound. Then, 
since F[-CLTT A, we have that {K F 'K4CLK} = {K F' U {T'T-'A}CLK}, 
which implies that a predicate wff 0 is F'-sound iff 0 is (F' U {-r'T-rA})-sound, 
as the reader can easily prove by induction on the complexity of 0. Since 
T'TB(y) is (F' U {T '-1A})-sound, as a consequence of Lemma 4.1 and of the 
fact that T'(F U {T-'A}) C F' U {Tr'T-A} and rB(y) is (F U {T-1A})-sound, 
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we conclude that T'TB(y) is F'-sound. Since F' and T' have been chosen 
in an arbitrary way, from FKCLT(-A X B(y)) and from the definition of 
F-soundness of a wff of the form Z1 X Z2, we have that T(-nA -X B(y)) 
is F-sound; thus, since FKCLTIx(-A - B(x)) (which immediately follows 
from FCLT(-1A -+ B(y)) previously stated, as well as from 0[--L(-A -+ 
3xB(x)) X 3x(-A -< B(x)) and FKCLT(-A -+ 3xB(x))), we have that 
T];x(-A X B(x)) is F-sound. Since T and F are arbitrary elements such 
that F E Negfi,, T is a transformation which is not empty for (-'A -? 
3xB(x)) -- 3x(-_A -k B(x)), and T(A -X 3xB(x)) is F-sound, by definition 
of 0-soundness we conclude that (--A - 3xB(x)) - x(-3XA -+ B(x)) is 0 
sound; hence (--A -? 3xB(x)) -X 3x(-'A -+ B(x)) E M,. 
A quite similar argument shows that (-A - B V C) -* (--A -< B) V 
(--A -e C) E M1 for any A, B and C. E 
Now we want to put into evidence another interesting principle of M1 
which, differently from (KPv) and (KP3), will not be used in the proof 
that M1 is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic. Such a 
principle is the well known Grzegorczyk principle (GRZ), whose addition 
to INT gives rise to a (standard) predicate logic semantically characterized 
by the class of all the Kripke models with constant domains, see [8, 9, 31]. 
The principle is so defined: (GRZ) is the axiom-schema whose instance are 
all the formulae Vx(A V B(x)) -+ A V VxB(x), where A and B(x) are any 
predicate wff's and where x is not free in A. 
We have: 
PROPOSITION 4.13. Every instance of (GRZ) belongs to M1. 
PROOF. First of all, for every A and B(x) with x not free in A, we have 
0KCLVX(A V B(x)) -e A V VxB(x). Now, let F E Negfin and let T be any 
transformation such that r is not empty for Vx(AVB(x)) X AVVxB(x) and 
TVx(A V B(x)) is F-sound. Then, we immediately get FKCLT(A V VxB(x)). 
On the other hand, we have that, for every y, T(A V B(y)) is F-sound. 
If rA is F-sound, then from FKCLT(A V VxB(x)) we immediately get that 
r(A V VxB(x)) is F-sound, and we are done. Otherwise, rA is not F-sound; 
thus, since Tr(A V B(y)) is F-sound for every y, we must have that rB(y) 
is F-sound for every y. In the latter case, since F is finite, we can choose 
an individual variable z such that z does not occur free in any formula of 
F, z is different from the free variables of TB(x) and TB(z) is F-sound. 
Since FKCLTB(z) is a consequence of the fact that rB(z) is F-sound, by 
the properties of the variable z we get FKCLVXTB(x); hence VxTB(x) is F 
sound, as a consequence of the definition of F-soundness and the fact that 
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TB(y) is F-sound for every y. Being FK CLT (A V VxB(x)), it follows that 
T(A V VxB(x)) is F-sound. Since F and T have been chosen in an arbitrary 
way, we therefore have that Vx(A V B(x)) -+ A V VxB(x) is 0-sound, hence 
Vx(A V B(x)) -+ A V VxB(x) e M1. a 
Now we are going to show that M1 is a maximal nonstandard predicate 
constructive logic. To do so, further lemmas are needed. We start from the 
following one: 
LEMMA 4.14. Let F = {-AA1} ..., -An E Negfin and let B be any predicate 
wff. Then B is F-sound iff -A1 A ... A A -+ B E M1 (if n = 0 then 
-A1 A ... A 
-An - B is equal to B). 
PROOF. Let --A1 A ... A 
--An -+ B E M1. Then, since -A1 A ... A nAn is 
immediately seen to be F-sound, by Lemma 4.1 we have that B is F-sound. 
Conversely, let B be F-sound. Then rFKLB, i.e., {-_A1, ..., 
-An}KCLB, 
and hence 0[cL A1 A... A-An X B. On the other hand, let F' E Negfin and 
let T be such that T is not empty for -A1AA...A 
-An -+ B and r(--A1A... A-An) 
is F'-sound. Then F'KT-CL rAl, F'K r'CLTr-An, which implies that TB is rF 
sound iff TB is (rF U F')-sound (as one easily proves by induction on the 
complexity of B). Since B is F-sound, by Lemma 4.1 TB is (Tr U F')-sound. 
Hence TB is F'-sound. U 
Using Lemma 4.14 we can prove: 
LEMMA 4.15. If F E Negfin then {B | F U M1HNTB} {B B is F 
sound}. 
PROOF. Suppose that F U M1 H-NTB. Then there is a proof in the nat 
ural calculus of intuitionistic predicate logic whose undischarged assump 
tions, say A1, ..., An) belong to F U M1. Since the elements of r are F-sound 
and the elements of M1, being 0-sound, are F-sound, we have that A1, ...,An 
are F-sound. Hence, arguing as in Lemma 4.4, B turns out to be F-sound. 
Conversely, let B be F-sound, with F = {-A1,... An}. Then, by 
Lemma 4.14, --A1 A ... A 
--An -+ B E M1. Since FHNT-1A1 A ... A -An 
it follows that F U M1, HNTB. 
COROLLARY 4.16. If F E Negfin then {B | F[-mB} = {B | B is F-sound}. 
PROOF. Since, for every set A of predicate wff's, every predicate wff 
B and every nonstandard predicate logic L, one has A U LHNTB iff AKLB, 
the assertion follows immediately from the previous lemma. L 
Finally, with the help of Corollary 4.16, we can prove: 
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LEMMA 4.17. Let L be any nonstandard predicate constructive logic such 
that M1 CL. Then, for every r1 E Negfin, {B K r<mB} = {B K rWLB}. 
PROOF. Of course, {B I I7K,B} C {B I 17LB} . Thus, we will 
show, by induction on the complexity of B, that 17LB implies 7K. B. In 
treating the basis of this induction we will consider only the case B = -'C. 
As a matter of fact, Proposition 4.9 and the hypothesis that M1 C L imply 
that L = E(L). Thus, for A atomic we have that EKLA iff F7- A and 
that rK,A iff K.-'A. 
Now, let B = -'C and 17LB; then, a fortiori, FKLB, i.e., 1-cL c, 
which implies, being -'C negated, that -_C if 1-sound. Hence, by Corollary 
4.16,1IKm -'C, i. e., FmB. 
The case B = C A D is an immediate consequence of the induction 
hypothesis. 
Let B = C V D and let 17LB, with {-'Al, ..., -nAn} = F (with n > 0). 
Then --A1 A ... A 
--An -- B E L (if n = 0, then B E L), which implies (being 
(-A1 A ... A --An) intuitionistically equivalent to -'A1 A ... A -~An) that 




C V D) -- (- -(--A1 A ... A 
-An) - C) V (--- (-A1 A ... A An) - 
D) CM1, which implies that ((A1A... A 
-An) - CV D) -( (--(A1A 
...A-nAn) _? C)V(--i(-'AlA...A-,An) -+ D) E L. Thus, being L constructive, 
we get _-(-'A ... A 
-An) - C E L or--(' A ... A -An) - D E L. 
Let, for the sake of definiteness, (-A1 A ... A 
--An) -+ C E L; then, 
-_A1 ,A... A --An -+ C E L, which implies FCLC. By induction hypothesis we 
therefore have FK1C, which yields r1 C v D, i.e., FK,B. 
The case B = VxC(x) immediately comes from the induction hypothesis 
and from the fact that 17K1C(y), with y an individual variable different 
from the free individual variables of F U VxC(x), implies FmK1VxC(x), the 
latter fact, in turn, coming from the closure of M1 under generalization. 
The case B = 3xC(x) is quite similar to the case B = C V D, since, by 
Proposition 4.12, all the instances of (KP3) belong to M1. 
Finally, let B = C -- D, let IKLC e D, but suppose that rHKm C -? D 
does not hold. Then, by Corollary 4.16, C -+ D is not 1-sound, which 
implies (since PKC -< D follows from FKLC -+ D) that there is F' E 
Negfin and a transformation r such that, for every H E F U {C -X D} 
r is not empty for H, TrF C F', TC is F'-sound and rD is not F'-sound. 
Hence, by Corollary 4.16, we have that F'K TC, while F7'K 1D does not 
hold. On the other hand, from 17LC -o D, TF C F' and the fact that L 
is closed under predicate transformation, we get F/ KT (C -+ D). Moreover, 
from F'K1 TC we get F'KTjC. Thus, by detachment, F'K TD. It follows, 
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by induction hypothesis, that F'KrD, a contradiction. 
Taking F = 0, from the previous lemma we get: 
THEOREM 4.18. M1 is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
Finally, using Theorem 4.18 and Corollary 3.15, we get: 
THEOREM 4.19. S(M1) is a maximal predicate constructive logic. 
REMARKS: 
D By Proposition 4.12, M1 contains all the propositional instances of the 
axiom-schema (KPv); moreover, by Proposition 4.9, for every proposi 
tional variable p, the propositional wff --'p -+ p belongs to M1. Thus, 
according to the treatment of [26], M1 includes the maximal nonstan 
dard propositional logic Eprop(MV), where MV is Medvedev's logic 
[4, 5, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26] and Eprop is the propositional extension 
operator described in [26] (there denoted E), which is the proposi 
tional counterpart of the operator E of the present paper. It follows 
that EprOp(MV) is included in the greatest propositional logic included 
in M1, i.e., Eprop(MV) C PROP(M1). On the other hand, since M1 
is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic, PROP(M1) is immedi 
ately seen to be a nonstandard propositional constructive logic. Hence, 
since Eprop(MV) is a maximal nonstandard propositional constructive 
logic, Eprop(MV) = PROP(M1); from this and from the treatment 
of [26], we immediately get MV = Sprop(PROP(M1)), where Sprop 
is the propositional standardization operator analyzed in [26] (there 
denoted S), which is the propositional counterpart of the operator S 
of the present paper. 
However, from MV = Sprop(PROP(Mi)) we get that MV includes 
PROP(S(M1)), but we do not know whether or not MV coincides 
with PROP(S(M1)). 
Indeed, let A E Sprop(PROP(Mi)). Then, for every propositional sub 
stitution aprop, we have that apropA E M,; but this does not seem to 
necessarily imply that, for every predicate substitution a, oiA E M1. 
Thus, even if PROP(S(M1)) is a (standard) propositional construc 
tive logic, we do not know whether PROP(S(M1)) is a maximal propo 
sitional constructive logic. Since PROP(S(MJ)) includes the propo 
sitional logic WKP studied in [26], according to the results of [26] 
we only know that MV is the only maximal propositional constructive 
logic including PROP(S(MJ)). 
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D The previous remark gives rise the problem of the existence of a max 
imal predicate constructive logic L such that PROP(L) is a maximal 
propositional constructive logic. Well, such a problem has a positive 
answer, using the Axiom of Choice. As a matter of fact, consider the 
class F of all predicate Kripke frames F = (P, <, D) so defined: 
1. the underlying poset (P, <) of F is a MV poset in the sense of 
[23]; 
2. the function D associating, with every ce E P, the domain D(a) 
of a is any (provided that the condition D(L3) C D(-y) for ,B, y E P 
and 3 _ -y is fulfilled). 
Then, it is easily shown that the predicate logic L generated by the 
class of frames Y (see, e.g., [6, 27, 28] for a definition) is constructive 
and that MV = PROP(L). Thus, by Zorn's Lemma (i.e., by the 
Axiom of Choice) there is a maximal predicate constructive logic L' 
such that L C L', hence MV C PROP(L'). Since MV is a maximal 
propositional constructive logic and PROP(L') is constructive, we get 
MV = PROP(L'). 
More generally, for each of the infinitely many maximal propositional 
constructive logics presented in [4, 5], using the Axiom of Choice we 
can claim that there is a maximal predicate constructive logic including 
it. 
D The method presented in this paper to get maximal predicate construc 
tive logics from maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logics has 
been previously applied in [4, 5, 26] to get maximal propositional con 
structive logics from maximal nonstandard propositional constructive 
logics. Also, these propositional applications have been enriched by 
a method to get Kripke frames semantics for standard logics starting 
from special Kripke frames semantics for nonstandard logics. Com 
bining these tools, infinitely many maximal propositional constructive 
logics have been presented as the logics generated by suitable classes of 
frames (posets), and the corresponding maximal nonstandard propo 
sitional constructive logics as the regular logics characterized by the 
same frames, considering only special Kripke models (called regular) 
built on them [4, 5]; moreover (differently from the maximal standard) 
such maximal nonstandard constructive logics have been recursively 
axiomatized (and have turned out to be decidable). 
Now, in the context of the present paper we are not able to get results 
comparable with the propositional ones. In this sense, we leave open 
the problem of stating whether S(M1) has a predicate Kripke frames 
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semantics (in the sense, e.g., of [27, 28]). Also, we do not know whether 
there is a recursive axiomatization of M1 (the unique extraintuition 
istic axioms we know are the formulae -_-_A -+ A for A atomic and the 
instances of (KUR), (KPv), (KP3) and (GRZ)). If such an axiom 
atization would exists, M1 would be recursively enumerable, hence a 
El-set in the arithmetical hierarchy, while S(M1) would be at most a 
H2-set (which would not exclude the possibility of proving that S(M1) 
is a E1-set too, even if, according to our previous experience in the 
propositional framework, the problem of providing a recursive axiom 
atization for S(M1) should be much more difficult than for M1). 
Note that, being axiom-schemes (their instances are closed under ar 
bitrary substitutions) of M1, (KUR), (KPv), (KP3) and (GRZ) are 
axiom-schemes of S(M1) too. 
Now, we will consider a new set of predicate wff's and, as for M,, we will 
prove that it is a kurodian maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
Let A be a predicate wff. We say that A is constructively sound (Csound 
for short) iff OKcLA and one of the following conditions hold: 
1. A is negated; 
2. A=BAC, and B is Csound and C is Csound; 
3. A = B V C, and B is Csound or C is Csound; 
4. A = B -X C, and, for every transformation T, if r is not empty for 
B - C and rB is Csound then TC is Csound; 
5. A = 3xB(x), and there is an individual variable y such that B(y) is 
Csound; 
6. A = VxB(x), and, for every individual variable y, B(y) is Csound. 
As made for M1, we define the set M2 of predicate wff's as: 
M2 = {A I A is Csound}. 
Following the ideas involved in the previous results related to M1, it is 
easy to show that M2 is a nonstandard predicate constructive logic, i.e., M2 
is closed under generalization, restricted substitution (a trivial modification 
of Lemma 4.1) and detachment; it includes INT (a trivial modification of 
Lemma 4.4) and is included in CL. 
As seen for M1, M2 = E(M2) and hence M2 is closed under H 
substitutions. Moreover, it is easy to prove that KC M2 and that (GRZ) 
is a principle of M2. 
Now, we prove that M2 is a maximal nonstandard predicate constructive 
logic. 
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THEOREM 4.20. Let L be any nonstandard predicate constructive logic such 
that M2 is included in L. Then, for any predicate wff A, if AEL then AE M2. 
PROOF. By induction on the complexity of A. Obviously A cannot be 
an atomic formula since L C CL. If A = -_B, then, since L C CL, the 
assertion follows trivially from the definition of Csoundness of the negated 
formulae. If A = B A C, or A = VxB(x), or A = B V C, or A = 3xB(x) the 
assertion follows from the induction hypothesis and (for the last two cases) 
from the constructiveness of L. Now, suppose that A = B -< C and B -+ C 
does not belong to M2. Since 0-cLB -+ C, there exists a transformation T 
such that r is not empty for B -+ C and rB is Csound, hence rB E M2, 
but TC is not Csound, hence TC 0 M2. Therefore, TB E L and TC 0 L by 
induction hypothesis. But, since B -< C E L and thus r(B -+ C) E L, we 
have a contradiction. E 
Finally, using Theorem 4.20 and Corollary 3.15, we get: 
THEOREM 4.21. S(M2) is a maximal predicate constructive logic. 
Of course, since S(M1) and S(M2) are maximal predicate constructive 
logics, S(M2) cannot be properly included in S(M1). Hence since (KUR) 
and (GRZ) are axiom-schemes of both logics, S(M2) must contain some 
extraintuitionistic axiom-schema independent of (KUR) and (GRZ). From 
this point of view, we do not know whether the axiom-schemes (KPv) and 
(KP3) hold in S(M2); more generally, we do not even know whether or not 
S(M2) and S(M1) are different predicate logics (i.e., whether or not M, 
and M2 are different nonstandard predicate logics). 
Now we end this section by giving an interesting characterization of M2 and 
S(M2). To do so, we generalize at the predicate level two notions analyzed 
in [26]. 
First of all, a generalized transformation rg will be either a (possibly non 
restricted) predicate substitution a, or an individual substitution 71, or a 
composition T9rT of two generalized transformations r9 and T1. On the other 
hand, a transformation r will be, as before, either a r-substitution ar, or an 
individual substitution rj, or a composition TT' of two transformations T and 
T'. The definition of "generalized transformation rg which is not empty for a 
predicate wff A" is given in a way quite similar to the one of "transformation 
r which is not empty for a predicate wff A". 
Now, let L be a nonstandard predicate logic, let F be a set of predicate 
wff's and let A be a predicate wff; then we define the relations I>L and 
IL between r and A as follows: 
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rF LA (respectively, FI- LA) if 
- 
F-cLA and, for every trans 
formation r (respectively, r9) such that, for every B E F U {A}, 
T is not empty for B (respectively, Tg is not empty for B), if 
{C C c E F} C L (respectively, {TgC I C E F} c L) then 
rA E L (respectively, TgA E L). 
Of course, if r[ LA then FlLA, but in general the converse does not 
hold. We say that a nonstandard predicate logic L is predicatively smooth 
(respectively, predicatively finitely smooth) iff, for every set F of predicate wf 
f's (respectively, for every finite set F of predicate wff's) and every predicate 
wff A, rI LA implies FKLA. We also say that a nonstandard predicate 
logic L is predicatively strongly smooth (respectively, predicatively finitely 
strongly smooth) iff, for every set F of predicate wff's (respectively, for every 
finite set F of predicate wif's) and every predicate wff A, F[-LA implies 
FKLA. 
Of course, since F1 LA implies F 1 LA, we have that if L is pred 
icatively (finitely) strongly smooth then L is predicatively (finitely) smooth 
(but the converse in general does not hold). For a predicatively (finitely) 
smooth nonstandard predicate logic L, while F[ LA implies rFLA for 
every (finite) F and every A, PHLA may fail to imply rFlLA, since a gen 
eralized transformation rg may be an arbitrary predicate substitution a and 
L is not necessarily closed under arbitrary predicate substitutions. Thus, 
smoothness (finite smoothness) is appropriately considered only for predi 
cate logics L; in this case, for every predicatively (finitely) smooth standard 
predicate logic L, every (finite) F and every A, we immediately get Fl LA 
iff FKLA. On the other hand, note that, for every atomic predicate wff A 
and every nonstandard logic L, { ---A} 1LA; it follows that only a regular 
nonstandard predicate logic can be (finitely) strongly smooth. Note also 
that, since a nonstandard predicate logic is closed under transformations, 
for any predicatively (finitely) strongly smooth L, any (finite) F and any A, 
we have that F 1 LA iff FKLA. 
The propositional counterpart of the previous definitions are respectively 
propositional smoothness, propositional finite smoothness, propositional 
strong smoothness and propositional finite strong smoothness. These propo 
sitional notions have been defined in [26] and are based on the relations 
rl- 1LA and FI[ r4 LA, defined as obvious reductions to the propositional prp prop 
context of IF- LA and FlLA, recalling that in the propositional frame 
the generalized transformations are arbitrary propositional substitutions 
aprop and the transformations 
are propositional restricted substitutions 7prop 
(in [26] the relations rFl[- LA and Flr +LA are denoted, respectively, 1-+LA 
and [r +LA, while the qualification "propositional" is omitted in the var 
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ious notions of smoothness). Note that in the propositional framework the 
condition "IF CLpropA and, for every propositional substitution aprop (respec 
tively, for every propositional restricted substitution Oprop),if {UpropC C E 
F} C L (respectively, {UpropC I C E F} C L) then upropA E L (respectively, 
or r A E L)" is quite equivalent to "for every propositional substitution prop 
aprop (respectively, for every propositional restricted substitution oprop) if 
{crpropC | C c F} C L (respectively, {prropC I C E F} C L) then upropA E L 
(respectively, cprropA E L)"; thus, the requirement "''[CLpropA"' is omitted in 
the definition given in [26] of the relations Fl LA and FILA. We also prop' prop 
recall that propositional finite smoothness is called structural completeness 
by the researchers of the polish school, see, e.g., [30]. 
We will be concerned with the finite smoothness of maximal (standard 
and nonstandard, propositional and predicate) constructive logics. From this 
point of view, we recall Prucnal's result, giving rise to a solution of Problem 
42 of [7], according to which Medvedev's logic MV is the greatest finitely 
smooth propositional constructive logic [30]. As discussed in [26], we also 
have that any smooth propositional constructive logic includes Rprop(MV) 
(taking into account smoothness in place of finite smoothness, we do not 
know whether there is some smooth propositional constructive logic; we do 
not even know whether MV is the unique finitely smooth propositional con 
structive logic). In [26] also propositional strong smoothness is taken into 
account; it turns out that Eprop(MV) is propositionally strongly smooth and 
the unique propositionally finitely strongly smooth nonstandard propositional 
constructive logic. Now, turning to the kurodian predicate constructive log 
ics, we want to show that S(M2) and M2 play the same roles, with respect 
to predicate finite smoothness and predicate finite strong smoothness, as 
MV and Eprop(MV) respectively do in the propositional framework. 
First of all, we prove: 
PROPOSITION 4.22. M2 is predicatively finitely strongly smooth. 
PROOF. Let F = {B1, ..., Bn} be any finite set of predicate wff's, let A 
be a predicate wff and let F I fM2A. Then B1 A ... A Bn -X A E CL and, for 
every transformation T such that, for every C E F U {A}, T is not empty for 
C, we have that if r(Bl A ... A Bn) is Csound then rA is Csound. It follows 
that B1 A ... A Bn -+ A E M2, hence FK A. M 
We can also prove: 
LEMMA 4.23. Let L' and L" be two kurodian predicatively finitely strongly 
smooth nonstandard predicate constructive logics. Then L' = L". 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.69 on Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:47:01 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
404 A. Avellone, C. Fiorentini, P. Mantovani, P. Miglioli 
PROOF. We show, by induction on the complexity of a predicate wff A, 
that A E L' iff A E L". Let A = --B (basis). Then the assertion immediately 
follows from the fact that L', L" C CL and both L' and L" are kurodian 
(note that the case where A is atomic is not to be taken into account, since 
no atomic formula belongs to CL). 
The cases A = B A C and A = VxB(x) immediately come from the in 
duction hypothesis (for the case A = VxB(x) closure under generalization is 
needed). The cases A = B VC and A = 3xB (x) are immediate consequences 
of the induction hypothesis and of the fact that L' and L" are constructive. 
Finally, let A = B -+ C, and suppose, e.g., that A e L' but A ? L". 
Since L" is finitely strongly smooth, we cannot have {B}1 [ C; hence, 
since from A E L' we get B -+ C E CL, there must be some transformation 
r such that r is not empty for B -+ C, rB E L", but TC 0 L". Note that 
the relevant complexity of rB does not exceed the one of B and the same 
holds for TC (since r involves only negated formulae and atomic formulae). 
Hence, we can apply the induction hypothesis, thus getting rB E L' and 
TOC L', which implies r(B -e C) 0 L'. Since L' is a nonstandard predicate 
logic, L' is closed under transformations. Hence, being B -* C E L', we 
have r(B - C) E L', a contradiction. 
From Proposition 4.22 and Lemma 4.23, we immediately get: 
THEOREM 4.24. M2 is the unique kurodian predicatively finitely strongly 
smooth nonstandard predicate constructive logic. 
Now, considering the standard predicate constructive logic S(M2), we 
can prove: 
PROPOSITION 4.25. S(M2) is a predicatively finitely smooth predicate con 
structive logic. 
PROOF. Let F = {Bi, ..., Bn} be a finite set of predicate wff's, let A be a 
predicate wff, let FlIS((M2)A but suppose that FY-S(M2)A. Then, first of all, 
B1 A ... A Bn -+ A 0 S(M2), which implies, by definition of the operator S, 
that there is a predicate substitution or such that o(B1 A...ABn -X A) 0 M2; 
since, by the M2-version of Proposition 4.9, we have M2 = E(M2), there 
is also a NegSat-substitution oNS such that orNS (B1 A ... A Bn -+ A) 0 M2. 
The latter fact implies (since aNS(Bl A ... A Bn -+ A) E CL follows from 
rI[s(M2)A) that there is a transformation r such that TaNS(B,A...ABn) E 
M2 and TaNSA 0 M2 (by definition of M2). Since aNS is a NegSat 
substitution, TraNS (B1 A ... A Bn - A) is a negatively saturated predicate 
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wff; hence, since TaNS(B1 A ... A Bn) E M2, we have that orNS(B1 A ... A 
Bn) E R(M2), which implies, by Theorem 3.10 and Proposition 3.13 (being 
M2 kurodian), that orNS(B1 A ... A Bn) E S(M2). On the other hand, 
from TcrNSA f9 M2 we immediately get TrNSA f S(M2). Thus, setting 
T9 = raNS, there is a generalized transformation Tg such that, for every C E 
F U {A}, r9 is not empty for C, {TgD I D E F} C S(M2) and TgA f S(M2). 
It follows that F [s(M2)A does not hold, a contradiction. a 
Now, to show that S(M2) is the greatest kurodian predicatively finitely 
smooth predicate constructive logic, we need the following lemma: 
LEMMA 4.26. If L is a kurodian predicatively finitely smooth predicate logic 
then E(L) is a predicatively finitely strongly smooth nonstandard predicate 
logic. 
PROOF. Let F = {Bi, ...5 3Bn be a finite set of predicate wif's, let A be a 
predicate wif, let F IE(L)A but suppose that F hLE(L)A. Then Bl A... ABn -- 
A 0 E(L), from which, arguing, e.g., as in the proof of Theorem 3.9, we get 
the existence of a r-substitution ar such that ar(Bl A ... A Bn - A) 0 L, 
i.e., {arBI, ..., arBn}KULgrA. Since L is finitely smooth, the latter fact 
implies that {orB, ...arBn} La rA does not hold, from which we get 
the existence of a generalized transformation Tg such that, for every C E 
{crrBli....arBn,arA}, T9 is not empty for C and {rgarBl,...5,9OrBn} C L 
but TgUrA 0 L. Hence, since arBi, arBn are negatively saturated predi 
cate wff's and L is kurodian, it is not difficult to show that there exists a (non 
generalized) transformation T such that, for every C'E{ar BI, ..., arBn5, arA}, 
T is not empty for C' and {TrrBlI...,,TrBn} C L but TarA ' L. From 
{TorrBl,...5TarBn} C L we get {TrrBl, ..., TrBn} C E(L); on the other 
hand, since TrrA is a negatively saturated predicate wff, from TarA 0 L 
we get TarA 0 R(L), from which (by Proposition 3.12, being L kurodian) 
TarA 0 R(E(L)), from which (being TrrA a negatively saturated predicate 
wff) TrrA 0 E(L). Hence, since Trr is a transformation, there is a trans 
formation T' such that, for every C" E F U {A}, T' is not empty for C", 
{T'D D E F} C E(L) but T'A 0 E(L). It follows that FHrE(L)A does not 
hold, a contradiction. E 
Now, from Proposition 4.25, Theorem 4.24 and Lemma 4.26 we get the 
following theorem, stating that S(M2) is the greatest kurodian predicatively 
finitely smooth predicate constructive logic and that R(M2) is a lower bound 
for any logic of this kind: 
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THEOREM 4.27. S(M2) is a kurodian predicatively finitely smooth predicate 
constructive logic and, for every kurodian predicatively finitely smooth pred 
icate constructive logic L, R(M2) C L C S(M2) 
PROOF. The fact that S(M2) is a kurodian predicatively finitely smooth 
predicate constructive logic follows from Proposition 4.25 and the M2 
version of Proposition 4.11. 
On the other hand, let L be a kurodian predicatively finitely smooth 
predicate constructive logic. Then, by Lemma 4.26 and Proposition 3.1, 
E(L) is a kurodian predicatively finitely strongly smooth nonstandard pred 
icate constructive logic. Hence, by Theorem 4.24, E(L) = M2, which implies 
L C M2. Since L is a standard predicate logic and S(M2) is the greatest 
standard predicate logic included in M2, we get L C S(M2). 
Finally, let L be a kurodian predicatively finitely smooth predicate con 
structive logic. Then, as seen in the previous discussion, E(L) = M2. 
Hence, since L is kurodian, from Proposition 3.12 we get R(L) = R(E(L)) = 
R(M2). Since R(L) C L, we immediately get R(M2) C L. 
REMARKS: 
tD We leave open the problem of stating whether S(M2) is the unique 
kurodian predicatively finitely smooth predicate constructive logic. 
r> We leave open the problem of stating whether there is some kurodian 
predicatively smooth predicate constructive logic. 
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